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Can Overconfidence be Debiased by Low-Probability/
High-Consequence Events?
Shu Li,∗ Jin-Zhen Li, Yi-Wen Chen, Xin-Wen Bai, Xiao-Peng Ren, Rui Zheng, Li-Lin Rao,
Zuo-Jun Wang, and Huan Liu
During the first half of 2008, China suffered three natural disasters: a heavy snow storm,
an outbreak of hand-foot-mouth disease, and a severe earthquake. The aim of the present
study is to explore how low-probability/high-consequence events influence overconfidence.
In Study 1, opportunity samples were obtained by recruiting residents in three different types
of disaster-hit areas to answer a peer-comparison probability judgment questionnaire about
1 month after the corresponding disaster occurred. The performance of 539 participants in
disaster-hit areas was compared with that of 142 residents in a nondisaster area. The find-
ings indicate that residents in disaster-hit areas were less overconfident than those in the
nondisaster area on both positive and negative events. In Study 2, we surveyed a total of
336 quake-victims 4 and 11 months after the earthquake to examine whether the impact of
disasters on overconfidence would decay with time. The resulting data indicate that the dis-
aster victims became more overconfident as time elapsed. The overall findings suggest that
low-probability/high-consequence events could make people less overconfident and more ra-
tional and seem to serve as a function of debiasing.
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1. INTRODUCTION
During the first half of 2008, China suffered
three natural disasters: a heavy snow storm in Hunan
Province, a severe outbreak of hand-foot-mouth dis-
ease (HFMD) in Anhui Province, and a major mag-
nitude 8.0 earthquake in Sichuan Province.
In January and February 2008, southern China
suffered “the coldest winter in 100 years,” where it
seldom snows in winter (e.g., in the worst snow-hit
province, Hunan, there are usually fewer than 10
days below 0 ◦C each year and the mean temperature
is usually above 4 ◦C in a typical winter season(1)).
A heavy snow storm led to deaths, structural col-
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lapses, blackouts, transport accidents and problems,
and livestock and crop losses. More than 100 mil-
lion people were affected and at least 60 people died
in the severe weather. In the worst-hit area, Chen-
zhou City of Hunan Province, 4 million people were
affected by power supply outages and water supply
shortages for more than a week. Experts said the cost
of damage from the severe snow storm was likely to
reach at least $7.5 billion.(2)
In April and May 2008, there was an outbreak
of HFMD1 among young children in China’s Anhui
Province. The EV71 and Cox A16 viruses were iden-
tified as the most common causes of HFMD in this
1 The epidemic was first recorded on March 20, 2008 (http://
english.gov.cn/2008-05/06/content 962324.htm). According to
Health Ministry reports, the outbreak in the worst-hit city was
under control on May 11, 2008 (http://english.sina.com/china/
p/1/2008/0511/157969.html).
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outbreak.(3) Patients with EV71 infection usually dis-
play serious symptoms. Infection by EV71 has led
to meningitis, encephalitis, pulmonary edema, and
paralysis in some cases with children. HFMD is very
contagious and spreads through direct contact with
nose and throat secretions, saliva, blister fluid, or
stool of an infected person and there is currently no
vaccine available. Fuyang City of Anhui Province,
the worst hit, registered 5,513 cases of infection and
22 cases of death according to the Ministry of Health
as of May 8, 2008.(3)
On May 12, 2008, a major earthquake measuring
8.0 on the Richter Scale jolted Sichuan Province and
neighboring areas. This earthquake affected an area
of 100,000 km2, caused 69,227 deaths and more than
374,000 injuries, with 17,923 missing as of September
25, 2008, according to Chinese official figures.(4) For
the first time in history, China declared 3 days (May
19 to May 21) of national mourning for the earth-
quake victims.
These disasters attracted the attention of the
whole nation and of the world. Entering the Chinese
key words “Hunan ( )” and “snow storm ( )”
in a search engine (www.google.cn) in February 2009
resulted in about 654,000 hits; “Anhui ( )” and
“HFMD ( )” 644,000 hits; and “Sichuan ( )”
and “earthquake ( )” 20,700,000 hits.
Disasters (e.g., the 9/11 terrorist attacks, tech-
nological hazards) are often described as “low-
probability/high-consequence events.”(5,6) Recent
debate has arisen regarding whether people become
more rational or irrational after a disaster.(5,7−9) For
example, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Americans
avoided flying due to a perceived dreaded risk and
instead chose to drive to some of their destinations
rather than fly. As a result, there were more car acci-
dents than usual; the number of Americans who lost
their lives on the road by avoiding flying during this
time was higher than the total number of passengers
killed on the four fatal flights of 9/11.(5) As flying is
generally considered safer than driving,(10) Gigeren-
zer argues that people become more irrational after
disasters and that informing the public about psycho-
logical research concerning postdisaster irrationality
could possibly save lives.(5) Sacco et al., however, re-
ported that the events of 9/11 caused outcomes of the
decision-making process to move closer to those ex-
pected from rational choices and that people had a
tendency to look for certainty and to avoid bigger
losses.(7)
The consecutive natural disasters in China in
2008 presented an opportunity for us to study
how human rationality is influenced by a low-
probability/high-consequence event.
In the words of one popular text on judgment:
“No problem in judgment and decision making is
more prevalent and more potentially catastrophic
than overconfidence.”(11) Most researchers consider
overconfidence a form of miscalibration: over a wide
range of conditions, subjects’ average probability
judgments exceed the proportions of general knowl-
edge items they answer correctly.(12) Overconfidence
also occurs when people believe themselves to be
better than others, such as when a majority of peo-
ple rate themselves better than the median. Lee et al.
call this peer comparison overconfidence.(13) Over-
confidence is seen as a major impediment to good
decision making.(14) The cognitive bias account of
overconfidence can be seen in theoretical propos-
als suggesting that biases in probabilistic judgment
occur as a consequence of the strategies by which evi-
dence is evaluated.(15−17) Even though lone individu-
als do not debias themselves, they are surrounded by
cultural mechanisms that compensate for their short-
comings.(18,19) Overconfidence may be debiased by
some social events.
This study explores whether people’s rational-
ity was influenced by the disasters that occurred in
China in 2008.
2. STUDY 1
This study aims to explore how disasters in-
fluence people’s overconfidence in disaster-hit and
nondisaster areas.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Materials and Procedure
We employed two future life events: a positive
event and a negative event. The two future life events
were adapted from Weinstein.(20) According to We-
instein, to get a job is a positive event; to be infected
by a disease is a negative one.(20)
We administered booklets that contained peer-
comparison problems to the participants. The peer-
comparison problems were adapted from Lee
et al.,(13) and read as follows:
A: Job Scenario (positive event):
Imagine a random sample of people, the same gender, the
same age, and the same work experience as you. Assume
that you yourself are one of the 100 persons. Suppose that
all 100 persons in the sample are looking for a job and all
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Table I. Demographic Characteristics of
the Study Samples
Snow Storm HFMD Earthquake Nondisaster
Area (N = 190) (N = 173) (N = 176) (N = 142)
Gender
Male 96(50.5%) 85(49.1%) 96(54.5%) 58(40.8%)
Female 92(48.4%) 84(48.6%) 80(45.5%) 75(52.8%)
Unknown 2(1.1%) 4(2.3%) 0 9(6.3%)
Age
Range 23–50 20–50 20–50 24–50
Mean[SD] 34.6[5.7] 33.1[7.3] 29.5[7.9] 34.6[6.7]
Missing cases 3 10 8 10
are ranked according to the date that they get a job. What
is your best estimation of the number in the sample (1–
100) that indicates your rank in getting a job?
B: Disease Scenario (negative event):
Imagine a random sample of people, the same gender, the
same age, and the same health condition as you. Assume
that you yourself are one of the 100 persons. Suppose that
there is presently a severe infectious disease and all 100
persons in the sample are ranked according to the date
that they get infected. What is your best estimation of the
number in the sample (1–100) that indicates your rank in
getting infected by the disease?
The problems were presented to participants on
paper-pencil questionnaires. The participants were
asked to estimate their own rank number between 1
and 100 inclusive and put the number in the blanks
as required. Once participants completed the survey,
they were thanked and debriefed. All the data in
the disaster devastated areas were collected 1.0–1.5
months after the corresponding disaster. The data
for the nondisaster area were collected a month af-
ter the heavy snow storm, but before the occurrence
of the HFMD outbreak and the May 12 earthquake.
The study was approved by the Institutional Re-
view Board of the Institute of Psychology, Chinese
Academy of Sciences. Oral consent was obtained
from the study participants.
2.1.2. Samples
Opportunity samples were obtained by recruit-
ing adult residents (nonstudent samples) in both
nondisaster and disaster-hit areas. Entry criteria in-
cluded an age of at least 20 years, literacy, and an
oral consent. An additional entry criterion for the
disaster-hit areas was that the participant was liv-
ing in the area when the disaster occurred. The sur-
vey was conducted door-to-door on an individual ba-
sis. Participants were paid a small fee (about 10)
for each completed questionnaire. The sample of
the heavy snow storm area included 190 residents
of Chenzhou City (worst hit), Hunan Province. The
sample of the HFMD outbreak area was 183 resi-
dents of Fuyang City (worst hit), Anhui Province.
The sample of earthquake areas was 85 residents
of Wenchuan County and 99 residents of Deyang
City (two among the most devastated areas), Sichuan
Province. The sample of the nondisaster area was
148 residents of Lianyungang City, Jiangsu Province.
Since it was irrelevant to ask those over retirement
age to estimate their percentile rank relative to their
peers in getting a job, respondents aged above 50
years2 (6 persons in nondisaster area, 10 in HFMD,
and 8 in earthquake areas) were excluded from the
analyses. Our final sample for Study 1, therefore,
consisted of 681 participants of legal working age.
Their gender and age information is presented in
Table I.
2.2. Results and Discussion
According to Lee et al.,(13) if participants are
neither overconfident nor underconfident, their av-
erage estimates of their percentile rank relative to
their peers should be in the 50th percentile. For Lee’s
problem of ability estimation, any estimate over the
50th percentile is an indication of overconfidence,
whereas an estimate below the 50th percentile re-
flects underconfidence. The higher the percentage
quoted by a participant, the higher the level of con-
fidence exhibited, and vice versa. To be comparable
to a general knowledge bias, peer-comparison over-
confidence (or possibly underconfidence, if negative)
is computed by the following bias equation:(13)
mean biasPeer Comparison
= mean percentile estimated − 50%.
2 According to law in China, men should retire at 60, women
cadres at 55, and women workers at 50.
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Table II. Participants’ Mean Estimation
of Their Own Percentile Rank on
Positive and Negative Scenarios
Disaster Condition
Snow Storm HFMD Earthquake Nondisaster
(N = 190) (N = 173) (N = 176) (N = 142)
Job scenario (positive event) 20.35(24.80) 21.62(21.45) 27.74(26.72) 15.31(19.24)
Reverse coding of job scenario 79.65(24.80) 78.38(21.45) 72.26(26.72) 84.69(19.24)
Disease scenario (negative event) 85.78(22.48) 72.13(30.56) 70.43(34.21) 82.82(26.39)
Notes: For consistency of data presentation across scenarios, reverse coding was used for the
job scenario so that a higher percentile rank always indicated a higher level of overconfidence
exhibited.
Fig. 1. Participants’ mean bias on
positive (job scenario) and negative
(disease scenario) events under different
disaster conditions.
In this study, if participants were neither over-
confident nor underconfident, their average esti-
mates of their percentile rank relative to their peers
should have been in the 50th percentile as well.
For the negative event (disease scenario), respond-
ing with a higher number implied a higher level of
overconfidence. The rank number of being infected
by a disease typically has a positive relationship with
the level of overconfidence and any estimate over the
50th percentile is an indication of overconfidence.
In this study, for the positive event (job sce-
nario), responding with a higher number implied a
lower level of overconfidence. Therefore, the rank
number of a participant getting a job would have
an inverse relationship with the level of overconfi-
dence. Any estimate below the 50th percentile would
be an indication of overconfidence. For consistency
of data presentation across scenarios, reverse coding
was used for the job scenario. Thus, a higher per-
centile rank always indicated a higher level of over-
confidence exhibited in both scenarios.
The residents’ estimates of their own percentile
rank in the job and disease scenarios, as well as the
results of reverse coding in the job scenario, are pre-
sented in Table II. The mean bias on positive (job
scenario) and negative (disease scenario) events are
shown in Fig. 1.
The four disaster conditions (snow storm,
HFMD, earthquake, and nondisaster conditions),
gender (male vs. female), and the three age groups
(20–29, 30–39, 40–50) constituted the levels of the
three between-subjects factors. Residents’ mean
ranks of NOT getting a job under different dis-
aster conditions were compared using a one-way
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analysis of variance (ANOVA). ANOVA analysis
for the estimates of participants’ percentile ranks
yielded a significant effect of disaster condition, F(3,
621) = 4.878, p < 0.01. Fisher’s least significant dif-
ference (LSD) post hoc tests (p < 0.05) revealed that
residents in the nondisaster condition tended to es-
timate their rank of NOT getting a job significantly
higher than that of those in the heavy snow storm
condition, the HFMD condition, and the earthquake
condition. The estimate of the residents in the earth-
quake condition was the lowest. There was no signif-
icant difference between the heavy snow storm and
HFMD conditions. These findings indicate that peo-
ple who have experienced a disaster tend to be less
optimistic about getting a job than those who have
not experienced a disaster.
ANOVA analysis for the estimates of partici-
pants’ percentile ranks of being infected by a dis-
ease yielded a significant effect of disaster condi-
tion, F(3, 620) = 8.976, p < 0.001. Fisher’s LSD post
hoc tests (p < 0.05) revealed that residents in the
nondisaster condition tended to estimate that their
rank of being infected by the disease significantly
higher than that of the HFMD and earthquake con-
ditions. There was no significant difference between
the heavy snow storm and nondisaster conditions.
These findings indicate that people who had expe-
rienced the HFMD outbreak or earthquake tended
to be more pessimistic about being infected by the
disease than those who had not experienced either
of these particular disasters. There was no signifi-
cant estimate difference between those who had ex-
perienced a heavy snow storm and those who had
not.
There was no gender (job scenario: F(1, 621) =
1.659, p > 0.05; disease scenario: F(1, 620) = 1.498,
p > 0.05) nor age (job scenario: F(2, 621) = 1.096, p >
0.05; disease scenario: F(2, 620) = 1.148, p > 0.05)
difference found.
The findings suggest that after a low-probability/
high-consequence event people’s confidence that
positive future life events will happen to them de-
creases, while confidence that negative future life
events will happen to them increases. Respondents’
rankings of themselves moved closer to the 50th
percentile, the median level, on both positive and
negative events. People’s overconfidence decreased
significantly after all three types of disasters surveyed
in both the job and disease scenarios, except that
overconfidence failed to decrease significantly in the
disease scenario after the heavy snow storm. A possi-
ble explanation for this exception is that the snow-hit
seems to have no relationship to the infectious dis-
ease described in the disease scenario.
3. STUDY 2
In Study 1, we found that residents in disaster-
hit areas were less overconfident than those in the
nondisaster area. It could be argued that the lower
overconfidence level in devastated areas might re-
flect differences in the location in which the surveys
took place rather than the disaster experience per se.
Nonetheless, most would agree that, if a lower over-
confidence level is due to a disaster, then the impact
of disasters should decay over time.
Bearing this in mind, we conducted follow-
up surveys in areas devastated by the May 12
earthquake (the most severe and latest catastrophe
in Study 1) to investigate whether overconfidence
would rebound with time. Specifically, in Study 2, we
hypothesized that, with time ticking away, victims’
optimism about positive future life events happening
to them would increase, while their pessimism about
negative future life events happening to them would
decrease.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Materials and Procedure
Two follow-up surveys were conducted 4 months
(second wave: September, 2008) and 11 months
(third wave: April, 2009), respectively, after the May
12 earthquake. The materials and procedure were
the same as in Study 1.
3.1.2. Samples
As in Study 1, a survey was conducted door-to-
door on an individual basis for adult residents (non-
student samples) in quake-devastated areas. Entry
criteria were the same as those in Study 1. The ad-
ditional entry criterion was that the participant was
living in the area when the earthquake occurred and
still living there when the follow-up survey was con-
ducted. We excluded 8 respondents aged above 50
years (2 persons of the second wave and 6 of the
third wave) from the study samples for the same rea-
son as in Study 1. Finally, the second wave sample of
the earthquake area was 131 residents (nonstudent)
in Deyang City, Sichuan Province, aged 20–50 years
(mean = 32.6, SD = 7.3). One hundred thirty (130)
participants disclosed their gender: 44 (33.8%) were
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Table III. Participants’ Mean Estimation
of Their Own Percentile Rank on
Positive and Negative Scenarios
Wave of Survey
First Wave (Study 1) Second Wave Third Wave
(N = 176) (N = 131) (N = 205)
Job scenario (positive event) 27.74(26.72) 22.31(22.35) 21.19(24.38)
Reverse coding of job scenario 72.26(26.72) 77.69(22.35) 78.81(24.38)
Disease scenario (negative event) 70.43(34.21) 66.90(35.60) 76.83(29.46)
Notes: For consistency of data presentation across scenarios, reverse coding was used for the
job scenario so that a higher percentile rank always indicated a higher level of overconfidence
exhibited.
Fig. 2. Participants’ mean bias on
positive (job scenario) and negative
(disease scenario) events since May 12
earthquake.
male, 86 (66.2%) female. The third wave sample of
earthquake area was 205 residents (nonstudent) in
Deyang City, aged 20–50 years (mean = 33.0, SD =
7.7), 65 (31.7%) male and 140 (68.3%) female.
3.2. Results and Discussion
As in Study 1, reverse coding was also used for
the job scenario for consistency of data presenta-
tion across scenarios so that a higher percentile rank
always indicated a higher level of overconfidence
exhibited.
The residents’ estimates of their own percentile
rank in job and disease scenarios from the second and
third waves of survey are presented in Table III. The
mean bias on positive (job scenario) and negative
(disease scenario) events are shown in Fig. 2. In or-
der to examine how people’s overconfidence changes
with time after a disaster, we included the data from
the first survey wave (previously reported in Study 1)
in the earthquake-devastated area as a baseline.
The three waves (first, second, and third waves),
gender (male vs. female), and the three age groups
(20–29, 30–39, 40–50) constituted the levels of the
three between-subjects factors. ANOVA analysis
yielded significant differences in residents’ mean
ranks of NOT getting a job across the three waves of
the survey, F(2, 483) = 3.200, p < 0.05. Fisher’s LSD
post hoc tests (p < 0.05) revealed that residents in the
third wave tended to estimate their rank of NOT get-
ting a job significantly higher than in the first wave.
Residents’ mean ranks of NOT getting a job failed
to reach statistical difference between the first and
the second waves and between the second and the
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third waves. Consistent with our hypothesis, victims
appeared to become more optimistic about getting a
job as time elapsed.
ANOVA analysis for the estimates of partici-
pants’ percentile ranks of being infected by the dis-
ease yielded a significant effect of wave, F(2, 484) =
3.446, p < 0.05. Fisher’s LSD post hoc tests (p < 0.05)
revealed that residents from the third wave of the
survey tended to estimate their rank of being infected
by a disease significantly higher than that from the
second and the first waves. The mean estimate did
not differ statistically between the first and the sec-
ond waves. The results support our hypothesis that
victims’ pessimism about negative future life events
happening to them decreases with time.
There was also no gender (job scenario: F(1,
483) = 0.327, p > 0.05; disease scenario: F(1, 484) =
0.369, p > 0.05) nor age (job scenario: F(2, 483) =
2.280, p > 0.05; disease scenario: F(2, 484) = 1.962,
p > 0.05) difference found.
Taken together, our data suggest that the lower
overconfidence level in the devastated areas in Study
1 was more likely to be attributed to the disaster,
given that the impact of disasters on overconfidence
decayed over time in Study 2.
4. GENERAL DISCUSSION
People routinely demonstrate unrealistic opti-
mism when judging their own vulnerability to nega-
tive events or prospects of positive events.(20,21) They
believe they are less likely to experience negative
events than others, but more likely to experience
positive events. Lee et al. call this tendency peer-
comparison overconfidence.(13) As it is logically im-
possible for most people to be better than others,
this perception is considered to be an irrational cog-
nitive bias in judgment, which has been labeled by
some researchers as “positive illusion” or “optimistic
bias.”(22−25)
In our Study 1, the findings interestingly re-
veal that disaster victims’ optimistic bias was sig-
nificantly smaller than that of residents in the
nondisaster area, suggesting that people became less
overconfident and more rational after a low-
probability/high-consequence event. In Study 2, data
from follow-up surveys in the earthquake-devastated
areas indicate that disaster victims ranked them-
selves further from the 50th percentile, the median
level, as time elapsed, suggesting that their optimistic
bias had somewhat rebounded. Study 2 provides ev-
idence to illustrate that the difference in overconfi-
dence levels between the residents in the disaster-hit
and nondisaster areas in Study 1 was more likely due
to the disasters themselves rather than a difference
in location. The overall finding suggests that disas-
ters influence overconfidence levels: experiencing a
disaster will likely give rise to less overconfidence.
Prior studies on gender difference in overconfi-
dence have produced mixed results.(26−28) Some stud-
ies have found no gender differences(26) and others
have reported that men are more overconfident than
women.(27,28) In our study there was no gender differ-
ence found.
Additionally, some researchers have reported
that older individuals display greater overconfidence
compared to younger ones.(29,30) Using a sample of
1,583 between 14 and 87 years of age, Renner et al.(31)
found that up to the age of 50 there was no significant
increase in optimistic health beliefs and that, above
50 years old, confidence increased with age. Our find-
ings of no age difference in overconfidence among
participants aged 50 and younger are consistent with
the results of Renner et al.
The influence of disasters on overconfidence
might be accounted for by the perceived event fre-
quency. It has been reported that the perceived fre-
quency of an event is correlated with the magnitude
of the optimistic bias,(20,32−35) though the correlation
found has been inconsistent. Some research suggests
that events perceived as more frequent elicit a larger
optimistic bias,(32) whereas other research suggests
that events perceived as less frequent elicit a larger
optimistic bias.(33,36,37) For example, Weinstein in-
vestigated the susceptibility to health problems of a
community-wide sample and reported that the mag-
nitude of the optimistic bias was larger for less fre-
quent events.(33) As people gave more weight to the
recency of an event,(35,38−40) vivid, singular infor-
mation,(41) and individual experience,(42) a recently
experienced disaster was more likely to influence
the perception of event frequency than a generally
described or earlier experienced disaster. The per-
ceived frequency account proposed by Weinstein(18)
might provide a possible and simple explanation for
our findings.
Thirty years of decision research has used ratio-
nal theories from economics, statistics, and logic to
argue that descriptive behavior falls systematically
short of normative ideals. Classical decision theory
assumes that people are essentially rational and any
errors are random and nonsystematic. The existence
of systematic biases is now largely accepted by de-
cision researchers and increasingly by researchers in
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other disciplines. But this apparent gap between the
normative and the descriptive has provoked much
debate: Is there, in fact, a gap? And, if so, can it
be closed—that is, can biases be “debiased”?(43−47)
Even though lone individuals do not debias them-
selves,(48) they are surrounded by cultural mecha-
nisms that compensate for their shortcomings.(18,19)
The present study suggests that major social and en-
vironmental events, such as the three disasters dis-
cussed, can serve as a function of debiasing.
The present results highlight some influence of
disasters on rationality. However, there remain a
number of unresolved problems. At present, it is un-
clear which of the two attributes of the disasters—
low probability, high consequences, or a combination
of the two—is more responsible for the confidence
calibration. On Tversky and Kahneman’s availabil-
ity view that individuals estimate the likelihood of
an event “by the ease with which instances or as-
sociations come to mind,”(49) the mere occurrence
of a low-probability event should be sufficient to
affect overconfidence. On the other hand, accord-
ing to Tversky and Kahneman’s representativeness
heuristic that individuals evaluate probabilities “by
the degree to which A is representative of B,”(41)
the mere fact that so many people (including par-
ticipants and/or people they know) have been dev-
astated should also be sufficient to affect overconfi-
dence. It is, in principle, possible that the effect was
caused by the combination of the two attributes of
the disasters. This problem is definitely worth further
investigation and study.
It is possible to speculate that using an oppor-
tunity sample of equal size rather than a victim-
population-based sample might lead to an underes-
timation of the calibration in the snow storm and
earthquake conditions in Study 1, which, in turn, may
contribute to the little sign of a dose-response ef-
fect(50) (e.g., the most severe disaster, the May 12
earthquake, has not led to a significantly greater cal-
ibration than any of the other two events). It also
could be argued that some social and economic con-
sequences of the low-probability/high-consequence
event, rather than the event itself, could have af-
fected the responses of residents in our current study
(e.g., those in the samples collected in the disaster
areas showing a reduced confidence in finding a job
might be due to the fact that the disasters made
the job market more competitive). Clearly, further
research is needed to determine whether the con-
sequences of these natural disasters upon decision
making are direct or indirect.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the Lee
et al. (1995) protocol appears to have some limi-
tations with regard to real-life situations,(51) even
though it has been previously used in other re-
search.(52,53) In future studies, other overconfidence
measurement (e.g., general knowledge overconfi-
dence measurement(12)) should be conducted to
confirm any effect. Additional research is also
necessary to clarify the effect of involvement on par-
ticipants’ reduction of overconfidence. Disentangling
the roles of kinship/similarity relation between the
devastated people and participant is critical, and may
enable us to predict under what conditions a reduc-
tion in overconfidence is likely to occur after a low-
probability/high-consequence event.
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